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Abstract
In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey of privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grid communications. Specifically,
we select and in-detail examine thirty privacy preserving schemes developed for or applied in the context of Smart Grids. Based
on the communication and system models, we classify these schemes that are published between 2013 and 2016, in five categories,
including, 1) Smart grid with the advanced metering infrastructure, 2) Data aggregation communications, 3) Smart grid marketing
architecture, 4) Smart community of home gateways, and 5) Vehicle-to grid architecture. For each scheme, we survey the attacks
of leaking privacy, countermeasures, and game theoretic approaches. In addition, we review the survey articles published in the
recent years that deal with Smart Grids communications, applications, standardization, and security. Based on the current survey,
several recommendations for further research are discussed at the end of this paper.
Index Terms
Smart grid communication, Security, Privacy, Attacks and countermeasures.
I. INTRODUCTION
ELECTRICITY is the energy of the future, which is growing day by day relative to that of gas, which is growing moremodestly, and that of oil, which is clearly receding [1]. This growth in electricity consumption is due to the development
of new information and communication technologies and a climate imperative, i.e., reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The
European Union (EU) is committed to reducing its energy consumption by 20% (compared to expected levels) by 2020 [2].
However, how can we control the electrical energy? The adaptation of Smart Grid is coming to answer this question. The Smart
Grid is defined by the U.S. Department of Energy as an electrical system capable of intelligently integrating the actions of
different users, consumers, and / or producers in order to maintain an efficient, sustainable, economical and secure electricity
supply [3].
As shown in Fig. 1, the Smart grid architecture consists of three types of network architecture (i.e., NAN, BAN, and
HAN), including a control center (CC) and some cloud servers CS = {CS1, CS2, CS3, . . . , CSn} [1]. The Home Area
Network (HAN) uses two types of digital networks, namely, Local Area Network (LAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN).
The BAN network connect various departmental networks within a single building, where the rates should be very high. The
Neighborhood area network (NAN) provides a secure communication channel between the power company and independent
users (a power generator) and the different types management of connected meters (e.g.,water, gas, electric). To transmit and
control the energy consumption data between these networks, a gateway can be placed in each type of network.
With the use of control software that will constantly improve power consumption and optimize costs, the future smart grid
can improve the security and reliability of the existing power grid [4]. Nevertheless, the Smart Grid cannot be widely deployed
without considering the security requirements, namely, authentication, integrity, non-repudiation, access control, and privacy.
For this, recently, researchers in the field of computer security have proposed several privacy-preserving schemes for Smart
Grid communications. As a result, we are motivated to investigate this schemes and provide a comprehensive and systematic
review of the recent studies on published privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grid communications. More precisely, we
select and in-detail examine thirty privacy-preserving schemes that are published between 2013 and 2016. See Tab. I for a
breakdown of publication dates.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We provide a classification for the attacks of leaking privacy in Smart Grids, including, key-based attacks, data-based
attacks, impersonation-based attacks, and physical-based attacks.
• We present various countermeasures and game theoretic approaches used in privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grids.
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Fig. 1. Smart grid architecture
• We present a side-by-side comparison in a tabular form for the current state-of-the-art of privacy-preserving schemes
(thirty) proposed for Smart Grids.
• We present a discussion of technical challenges and open directions for future research. In particular, we believe that
more work is needed on 1) Attacks such as Sybil attacks, Forgery attacks, and Wormhole attacks, 2) Intrusion Detection
mechanisms 3) IoT-driven Smart Grids, 4) Metrics for interdependent privacy, 5) Cloud computing services in Smart
Grids, 6) Privacy for Internet of Energy (IoE), and 7) Ethics and Privacy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we summarize the existing survey works about Smart Grid
communications, Smart Grid applications, Smart Grid security, and Smart Grid privacy. In section III, we present an overview
of privacy attacks in Smart Grids and defense schemes. Then in section IV, we discuss the countermeasures, game theoretic and
formal proof approaches. In section V, we present a side-by-side comparison in a tabular form for the current state-of-the-art
of privacy-preserving schemes proposed for Smart Grids. Finally, we identify the future directions and give the conclusion in
section VI, VII, respectively.
TABLE I
PUBLICATION DATE BREAKDOWN - SURVEYED PAPERS
Paper Year Paper Year Paper Year
Sun et al.
[5]
2013 Li et al. [6] 2015 Tsai et al.
[7]
2016
Wen et al.
[8]
2013 Chen et al.
[9]
2015 Dimitriou
et al. [10]
2016
Liang et al.
[11]
2013 Chen et al.
[12]
2015 Ni et al.
[13]
2016
Wen et al.
[14]
2014 Bao et al.
[15]
2015 He et al.
[16]
2016
Li et al.
[17]
2014 Jiang et al.
[18]
2015 Bao et al.
[19]
2016
Fan et al.
[20]
2014 Abdallah
et al. [21]
2016 He et al.
[22]
2016
Jia et al.
[23]
2014 Saxena et
al. [24]
2016 Wang et al.
[25]
2016
Saxena et
al. [26]
2015 Liu et al.
[27]
2016 Rahman et
al. [28]
2016
Shi et al.
[29]
2015 Han et al.
[30]
2016 Tan et al.
[31]
2016
Deng et al.
[32]
2015 Wan et al.
[33]
2016 Gong et al.
[34]
2016
II. SURVEY ARTICLES FOR SMART GRIDS
There around forty survey articles published in the recent years that deal with smart grids communications, applications,
standardization and security. These survey articles are categorized as shown in tables II and III.
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TABLE II
AREAS OF RESEARCH OF EACH SURVEY ARTICLE FOR SMART GRIDS
Reference Security/
Privacy
Communi-
cations
Applications Energy manage-
ment / Power
Electronics
Standard-
ization
Game
Theoretic/
Complex
Networks
Projects
/ demos
V2G
[35], [36], [37], [38],
[39], [40], [41], [42],
[43], [44], [45]
X
[46] X X
[47], [48] X X
[49] X X X X
[50], [51], [52], [53],
[54], [55], [56]
X
[57], [58] X X
[59], [60], [61] X
[62] X
[63], [55] X
[64], [65] X
[66] X X
[67], [68] X X X
[69], [70] X X
[71] X X X
[72] X X
[73], [74] X
[75] X
[76] X X X X
[77] X
[38] X X
[78] X v
TABLE III
SURVEY ARTICLES FOR SMART GRIDS GROUPED BY AREA OF RESEARCH
Reference Area of research
[35], [47] [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41],
[42], [43], [44], [67], [71], [48], [68], [45]
Security / Privacy
[46], [47], [49], [36], [50], [51], [66], [67],
[69], [70], [71], [52], [53], [54], [55], [56],
[76], [48], [68], [58]
Communications
[57], [73], [74], [76] Applications
[46], [49], [62], [66], [71], [76], [78] Standardization
[64], [65], [72], [62] Game theoretic ap-
proaches / Complex
Networks
[59], [60], [61] Projects
[49], [63], [67], [69], [70], [72], [79], [76],
[68], [78]
Energy Management /
Power Electronics
[38], [77] Vehicle to Grid Tech-
nology
A. Smart Grid Communications
Several articles describe the communication requirements and capabilities that can be used or combined in order to support
the smart behavior of a grid [36], [46], [47], [49], [50], [51], [52], [53], [66], [67], [69]–[71], [54], [55], [56], [76], [48], [68].
Authors in [71] focus on wireless communication networking technologies for smart grid neighborhood area networks (NANs).
Authors in [52] survey different opportunities and challenges of applying WSNs in smart and present several field tests that
have been performed on IEEE 802.15.4-compliant wireless sensor nodes in real-world power delivery and distribution systems.
These field trials were performed in order to measure background noise, channel characteristics, and attenuation in the 2.4-
GHz frequency band. Gomez et al, in [53] survey the most relevant current and emerging solutions suitable for Wireless home
automation networks at Grid: ZigBee, Z-Wave, INSTEON, Wavenis, and IP-based solutions. Following a different approach,
authors in [67] and [55] specifically focus on how cloud computing (CC) could be used for energy management, information
management and security of the Smart Grid. In two similar survey works [54], [56] that were published in 2011 and 2016
respectively, authors research how cognitive radio would support smart grid idea including system architecture, communication
network compositions, applications, and CR-based communication technologies.
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TABLE IV
YEAR OF PUBLICATION
Reference Year
[60], [62], [52], [53] 2010
[46], [59], [64], [66], [54], [79] 2011
[35], [39], [47], [51], [70], [65], [73], [61], [55],
[75]
2012
[36], [43], [49], [50], [57], [63], [67], [69] 2013
[37], [40], [71], [72], [74] 2014
[41], [42], [77], [48] 2015
[38], [44], [56], [76], [68], [78], [58] [45] 2016
B. Smart Grid Applications
Several survey articles [57], [73], [74], [76] focus on the applications that can be supported from a Smart Grid, while on
the works presented in [46], [49], [62], [66], [71], [76] authors discuss standardization issues that are related to Smart Grids.
Energy management and Power electronics are two important aspects of a smart grid and these issues are surveyed in [49],
[63], [67], [69], [70], [72], [79], [76]. In [63] authors discuss demand response potentials and benefits in smart grids. The
potential of using game theory-based methods to solve different problems in smart grid are surveyed in [64], [65], [72], [62].
Especially in [62] authors present a very interesting survey article for Smart Grids. The article explores the most important
scientific studies that used Complex Network Analysis techniques and methodologies for investigating the properties of several
Power Grids infrastructures. Tan et al [77], review the concept, framework, advantages, challenges and optimization strategies
of V2G technology, which is one of the smart grid technologies that involves the Electric Vehicle (EV) to improve the power
system operation. Authors in [58] discuss about the electric grid as a composition of sub-systems with increasing autonomy
that interact in order to transform the grid into a smart system, forming a system-of-systems. Since the current survey article
focuses on privacy preserving techniques on Smart Grids, we present in the next subsection a detailed analysis of the published
survey articles that focused on smart grid security.
C. Smart Grid Security
Liu et al. [39] presented back in 2012 an early survey about cyber security and privacy issues in the Smart Grid. The article
concludes that privacy in Smart Grids may be addressed by adopting newly anonymous and camouflage communication
technologies. The same year, authors in [35] discuss specific security requirements that a smart grid has, along with
challenges and current solutions. They describe several existing solutions that have been implemented or tested on real industry
environments that are related to privacy protection, integrity, authentication and trusted computing. Regarding privacy, authors
describe briefly seven encryption and anonymization techniques and do not provide any critical comparison of the presented
methods. Also since the report was published on 2012 it doesn’t cover novel methods that were introduced the previous 5
years. One year later in 2013, Wang et al. in [36] provides a detailed survey of cyber security issues and challenges for Smart
Grids. Similar to [35], authors present current requirements that a Smart Grid has making it a demanding environment in terms
of both security and reliability. Authors also categorize and evaluate network threats using case studies and describe network
and cryptographic countermeasures against cyber attacks. By devoting a section for privacy, authors present and analyze in
depth cryptographic, authentication and key management, along with case studies for every sub-category. The article concludes
that a tradeoff between latency and privacy is a major issue in Smart Gird security, where physical layer authentication can be
a solution especially for wireless communications. Key management techniques can also increase the privacy that is reassured
from the system and the combination of different communication capabilities can help increase system’s performance as
long as secure communication is reassured. The survey is very detailed and analytical but since 2013 new advanced security
methods and privacy solutions have been proposed that the current article tries to critically discuss and analyze. In 2014,
Komninos et al. [37], discusses open issues, challenges and countermeasures for smart grid and smart home security. This
article, compared to the previous ones, emphasizes mostly on smart home security and how this is combined with the concept
of Smart Grid security. Authors present major security goals that are expected to be met and identify threats that may occur
under representative scenarios of interaction between Smart Home and Smart Grid entities along with the impact that they
have on the system. Authors also describe several privacy preserving methods that are based on anonymization, encryption,
perturbation, verifiable computation models and obfuscation. The main conclusion of the article regarding privacy is the need
of a legal framework specific to privacy in the Smart Grid, the establishment of new key management techniques and new
aggregation mechanisms. The article doesn’t focus on privacy preserving schemes, as the current survey does, but discuss the
general concept of smart grid security viewed under the smart home interaction perspective. Han et al. [38], in 2016 presents an
analysis of privacy preservation issues for V2G networks. Authors summarize current solved problems, various techniques used
and their pros and cons but their work is limited only for V2G communications that is a small part of a Smart Grid network.
Song et al. [44], in 2016 presents another survey article that discusses security advances of Smart Grid from a data driven
approach. On this aspect Song thoroughly investigates data generation, data acquisition, data storage, data processing and data
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analytics aspects of smart grid security. The article presents future open issues, such as security of plug in electric vehicles,
transactive energy and architectures and frameworks in context of Internet of Things, but doesn’t focus on privacy preserving
schemes that the current survey does. In addition, Cintuglu et al. [45] present a survey on Smart Grid cyber-physical system
testbeds by providing a four step taxonomy based on Smart Grid domains, research goals, test platforms, and communication
infrastructure.
D. Smart Grid Privacy
There exist four surveys that are recently published and are focused on privacy preserving for Smart Grids [40]–[43]. Authors
in [43] present the state of the art of privacy preserving techniques, focusing mostly on data aggregation. The article that was
published in 2013 showcases the existence of sophisticated methods that can disaggregate the measurements and provide an
accurate estimation of the moment when each appliance is turned on and off. Due to this, authors decided to focus on data
aggregation techniques that are used to preserve privacy in a Smart Grid. Based on their analysis they define three main
categories of challenges, those related to secure cryptographic protocols, those related to hardware limitations and finally those
related to signal processing. Authors back in 2014 [40] presented state of the art approaches that are related to the problem
of customer privacy-protection in the smart grid. In order to so, they introduce two terms that describe important problems
that have to be solved concerning privacy and smart metering: metering for billing and metering for operations. They argue
that there is a tradeoff between sampling frequency attribution and exactness on the one hand and privacy on the other hand.
Accurate and frequent metering can give the necessary information to the billing and management company of a Smart Grid but
imposes threats regarding privacy of the consumers. They categorize the different methods in different groups, e.g. aggregation,
cryptography, anonymization, imprecise data etc. Uludag et al. [41], in a chapter that was published in 2015 focuses on the
problem of determining sophisticated usage patterns from the smart meter data and the countermeasures. After trying to define
the term privacy by viewing it from different angles, e.g. personal, information, organization and intellectual, Uludag tries to
define the different privacy concerns that are related to a Smart Grid. By performing a detailed taxonomy of solutions that were
published until 2015, the article identifies the various strengths and weaknesses of each method and discusses open issues and
future opportunities. Finally, the same year (2015) de Oliveira [42] publishes a report detailing Privacy-Preserving Protocols
for Smart Metering Systems.
All of the aforementioned surveys that are related to privacy preservation for Smart Grids are published until 2015 and don’t
cover state of the art methods that were recently introduced. The current survey focuses on privacy preserving methods for Smart
Grids and discusses performance and limitations of each scheme. It also presents a detailed taxonomy of the state of the art
of privacy preserving methods for smart grids and a full list of all current research efforts and trends. Based on this thorough
analysis open issues and future directions are identified that combine both innovative research along with the application,
through appropriate adaptation, of existing solutions from other fields. We believe that this study will help researchers focus
on the important aspects of privacy issues in the smart grid area and will guide them towards their future research.
III. THREATS AND REQUIREMENTS
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF PRIVACY ATTACKS IN SMART GRIDS AND DEFENSE SCHEMES
Xindicates fully supported; x indicates not supported; 0 indicates partially supported.
Privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grids
Adversary model
[26] [29] [23] [6] [9] [12] [15] [18] [32] [5] [17] [14] [8] [11] [20] [31] [28] [33] [19] [25] [16] [13] [10] [22] [7] [30] [27] [24] [21]
Key-based attacks X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 0 X X X X X X 0 X X 0 X X X X X
Data-based attacks X X X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 X X X X X 0 0 X X X X X X X 0 X 0
Impersonation-
based attacks
X 0 0 0 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 X 0 0 X X X 0 X X
Physical-based at-
tacks
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 0 X X 0 0 0 X X X
In this section, we discuss the attacks of leaking privacy in Smart Grids. Generally, the classification of attacks in Smart
Grids frequently mentioned in the literature is done using different criteria such as passive or active, internal or external etc. In
our survey article, we classify the attacks of leaking privacy in Smart Grids in four categories as shown in Fig. 2, including,
1) key-based attacks, 2) data-based attacks, 3) impersonation-based attacks, and 4) physical-based attacks. In addition, Tab. V
provides a detailed description of different privacy attacks in Smart Grids and defense schemes.
A. Attacks of leaking privacy in Smart Grids
1) Key-based attacks
Generally, after the registration phase, each part in a Smart Grid has a secret key or certificate to carry out the authentication
phase. At any moment, an adversary (the customer or the operators/ maintenance personnel) can launch both known key
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Fig. 2. Classification of attacks of leaking privacy in Smart Grids
attack [80] and unknown key share attack [81] on an authenticated key agreement or authenticated key agreement with key
confirmation. More precisely, in known key attack, an adversary records the frequencies in each byte of the plaintexts and
ciphertexts. Nevertheless, in the unknown key share attack, an adversary manipulates two entities A and B where A ends up
believing she shares a key with B, and although this is in fact the case, B mistakenly believes the key is instead shared with
an entity E 6= A. Since the private key is different and the public identity of each user is newly generated for each session,
both the schemes [26] [24] can prevent the known key attack and the scheme [7] can resist to the unknown key share attack.
Fig. 3. HDA attack in Smart Grid defined by Jia et al. in [23]
2) Data-based attacks
To ensure the electricity data integrity in Smart Grids, customers can help by shifting their electricity consumption to
different times, which is not always possible as discussed in [83]. However, an adversary can launch several modification
operations on the electricity data that contain the information about the electricity consumption. We classify nine attacks
in this category of data-based attacks, namely, integrity violation, repudiation attack, malicious data mining attack, human-
factor-aware differential aggregation (HDA) attack, chosen-plaintext-attack, chosen-ciphertext attack, data integrity attack, data
pollution attack, and modification attack. If an external adversary is successful at modifying the transmitted data, the integrity
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Fig. 4. MITM attack defined by Conti et al. in [82]
violation (data loss) can be performed, which is prevented by the scheme [26] using the idea of access control. The repudiation
attack [84] refers to a denial of participation in all or part of the communication in Smart Grid, which can be prevented by
the scheme [24] using the identity and hash-signature verification. If an adversary is successful at corrupting the aggregator
and collaborates with some compromised meters, the malicious data mining can be performed, which can prevented by the
scheme [23] based on the privacy-preserving aggregation phase. As defined by Jia et al. [23], the HDA attack is based on
the effect of the human factor on the data aggregate where an adversary can obtain smart meter id3’s readings by comparing
two aggregation results as shown in Fig. 3. The scheme in [23] can resist to HDA attack under the Byzantine attack. If an
adversary can distinguish a ciphertext when two corresponding plaintexts are given, the chosen-plaintext-attack [85] can be
launched, which can be prevented by the scheme [30] using the random layer and the homomorphic layer. If an adversary
knows the ciphertexts that are used into the Smart Grid and can obtain the resulting plaintexts, the chosen-ciphertext attack
(CCA) [86] can be launched which can lead to the recovery of the hidden secret key used for decryption. The CCA attack can
be prevented by the scheme presented in [20] by using an identity-based encryption. The data integrity attack in Smart Grid
TABLE VI
APPROACHES FOR DETECTING AND AVOIDING THE MITM ATTACK
Reference Data attacked Approach
Saxena et al.
(2016) [26]
Message information over the network Two-factor authentication based on a
random private key
He et al.
(2016) [16]
Information between the smart meter
and the server provide
Mutual authentication between the smart
meter and the server provider based on
the lightweight anonymous key distribu-
tion
He et al.
(2016) [22]
Information between the aggregator and
the user
Authentication between the aggregator
and the user using the id-based signature
scheme
Tsai et al.
(2016) [7]
Information between the smart meter
and the server provide
Authentication between the smart me-
ter and the server provide using the
identity-based cryptosystems
Saxena et al.
(2016) [24]
Information between electric
vehicles, local aggregator, and
certification/registration authority
Authentication based on the dynamic
accumulator
consists of a set of compromised power meters whose readings are altered by an adversary [87]–[90]. Giani et al. in [87], [88]
defines some new data integrity attacks such as the unobservable attack and the irreducible attack. Xie et al. in [89] study the
economic impact of a data integrity attack in power market operations. Sridhar et al. in [90] is modeling the integrity attacks
based on both the Min attack and the Max attack model. Here we must note that we did not find any privacy-preserving scheme
that studies the data integrity attack in Smart Grid, but we have found five privacy-preserving schemes [13], [16], [22], [28],
[31] that can detect both false data attack and modification attack by checking the legality of the message authentication code
and the digital signature, as presented in Tab IX. As discussed in [91], with the data pollution attack, an adversary can force
the gateways to cache non-popular content in order to affect overall network performance and increase link utilization. Both
schemes [10], [13] can solve the data pollution attack using orthogonal techniques such as zero knowledge proof.
3) Impersonation-based attacks
At any time, an adversary can capture data from the Smart Grid transmitted by other smart meters and read the data content
in order to recover the information about the energy that is consumed at the smart home. We classify five attacks in this
category of impersonation-based attacks, namely, man-in-the-middle attack, replay attack, redirection attack, impersonation
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TABLE VII
APPROACHES FOR DETECTING AND AVOIDING THE REPLAY ATTACK
Reference Data attacked Approach
Saxena et al.
(2016) [26]
Transmitted message to the user or the
server over the network
Timestamp
Bao et al.
(2016) [19]
Information between the gateway and
the cluster head
Timestamp
He et al.
(2016) [16]
Information between the smart meter
and the server provide
Timestamp
He et al.
(2016) [22]
Information between the user and the
aggregator
Timestamp
Han et al.
(2016) [30]
Information between battery vehicles
and local aggregators
Timestamp
Saxena et al.
(2016) [24]
Information between electric vehicles
and local aggregator
Timestamp
Abdallah et
al. (2016)
[21]
Information between local aggrega-
tors, electric vehicles, and charging
stations
Timestamp
TABLE VIII
APPROACHES FOR DETECTING AND AVOIDING THE IMPERSONATION ATTACK
Reference Data attacked Approach
Saxena et al.
(2016) [26]
Impersonate the users involved in the
Smart Grid system (Case-1: Imper-
sonates the maintenance personnel;
Case-2: Impersonates the intelligent
electronic devices)
Different key pair at each device to
prevent the use of old parameter values
in other devices
He et al.
(2016) [16]
Impersonates the smart meter and the
server provider
Checking the legality of received mes-
sages based on the elliptic curve cryp-
tography
He et al.
(2016) [22]
Impersonates the users and the aggre-
gator
Checking the legality of received mes-
sages based on the id-based signature
scheme
Han et al.
(2016) [30]
Impersonates the battery vehicles and
the local aggregator
Based on an access authority
Saxena et al.
(2016) [24]
Impersonates the electric vehicles Mutual authentication between all elec-
tric vehicles with local aggregator
and/or certification/registration authority
attack, and eavesdropping attack. The Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack is one of the popular attacks in the new generation
networks such as the Smart Grid. As shown in Fig. 4, an MITM attack is the interception of data passing between two smart
meters or a smart meter and a gateway in order to modify the data that pass through, without the victims being aware of
it [82]. Specifically, smart meters and the gateway try to initialize secure communication by sending each other their public
keys (messages M1, M2, M’1, M’2). An adversary intercept M1,M2,M’1, and M’2, and as a return sends its public key to
the victims (messages M3, M4, M’3, M’4). After that, smart meter 1 and gateway encrypts its message by adversary public
key, and sends it to smart meter 2 (messages M5 and M’5). Adversary intercepts M5 and M’5, and decrypts it using known
private key. Then, adversary encrypts plaintext by smart meter 2 public key, and sends it to smart meter 2 (messages M6 and
M’6). We have found five privacy-preserving schemes that can detect and prevent the MITM attack, as presented in Tab. VI.
The replay attack is a type of MITM attack where an adversary intercept data packets in Smart Grid and replay them to the
destination server. We have found six privacy-preserving schemes that can detect and prevent the replay attack, as presented
in Tab. VII, which all these schemes use the timestamp approach. In the V2G networks, an adversary can redirect the vehicles
messages to another network out of the original network when accessed. Note that a redirection attack is usually integrated
with a phishing attack [92]. The scheme in [24] can defeat redirection attacks using the location verification of each EV by
matching received information from the EV with the stored information. During the authentication between the smart meters
and gateways, an adversary can initiate an impersonation attack, when he can fake the identity of one of the legitimate parties
in the Smart Grid [93]. We have found five privacy-preserving schemes that can detect and prevent the impersonation attack,
as presented in Tab. VIII. The eavesdropping attack can occur when an adversary can access the data path of Smart Grid
and then can monitor and read all traffic between the smart meters and getaways in order to compromise the privacy of
residential users. Based on the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem [94] and differential privacy, the scheme [15] is secure against
the eavesdropping attack. In addition, the scheme [33] is secure and can detect the eavesdropping attack using an anonymous
signature scheme.
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TABLE IX
APPROACHES FOR DETECTING AND AVOIDING THE FALSE DATA ATTACK AND MODIFICATION ATTACK
Reference Data attacked Approach
He et al.
(2016) [16]
The data exchanged between Smart
meter and Server provider
By checking the legality of the message
authentication code and the digital signature
He et al.
(2016) [22]
The power usage information between
a user and an aggregator
The aggregator could find any modification
of the message by checking whether the
equation e (σi, g1) = e(RiX
hi
i , T )
Ni et al.
(2016) [13]
The false consumption data to mislead
the control center to make irrational
decisions
By using the Schnorr signature to ensure the
integrity of the reports during transmission
Tan et al.
(2016) [31]
Retrieve personal consumption infor-
mation by intercepting the communi-
cation between the smart meter and
the data aggregator
By using a simple message authentication
Rahman et
al. (2016)
[28]
The communication channels between
a bidder and a bidding manager or a
bidder and a registration manager
By using El-Gamal public key encryption
and Schnorr signature scheme
4) Physical-based attacks
An adversary may target the hardware of a battery vehicle, a local aggregator, a gateway or the proxy server to execute an
attack such as differential attack, malware attack, collusion attack, and inference attack. To acquire the individual user’s data
in a Smart Grid, an adversary can lunch a differential attack. The scheme [12] use the differential privacy proposed in the
work [95] in order to detect the differential attack. The scheme presented in [15] is secure against differential attack using
an appropriate Laplace noise in the form of ciphertext in order to achieve the differential privacy. An adversary can launch a
malware attack by deploying undetectable malwares in Smart Grid targeting the privacy disclosure of residential users. Based
on the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem [94] and differential privacy, the scheme in [15] can resist against the malware attack.
By introducing secure self-healing mechanism, the scheme in [18] can resist collusion attack. The scheme in [8] can prevent
the cloud server in collusion by using an identity-based encryption scheme in the data encryption phase to encrypt messages.
Liang et al. in [11] authors considered collusion attacks launched by multiple compromised homes. Specifically, the scheme
in [11] can resist collusion attacks using the proximity score calculation algorithm. If an external adversary is successful at
analyzing attributes in database management system, the inference attack can be performed, which is prevented by the scheme
presented in [30] using the idea of separable key-chaining management. In order to detect opportunistic attacks in Smart Grid
cyber-physical system, li et al. in [96] proposes a scheme using a dirichlet-based probabilistic model [97] that is used to assess
the reputation levels of decentralized local agents.
B. Security Requirements
In order to protect Smart Grid communications against the threats mentioned above, privacy-preserving schemes proposed
for Smart Grids should satisfy the following security requirements [35]–[44], [47], [48], [67], [68], [71], [98]:
• Authentication: When the parts of Smart Grid (smart meters, gateways, local aggregators) want to access in the system,
they must initially perform an identification and authentication procedure. The identification is a phase of establishing the
identity of the parts. The authentication is a phase that allows the parts to provide proof of identity.
• Integrity: Integrity is the ability to assure that messages exchanged (sent, received or stored) between the parts of Smart
Grid has not been modified or deleted.
• Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation in Smart Grid is the ability to prevent a smart meter from denying his involvement in
an action in which he participated, for example, denying that the energy reports have been sent by itself.
• Access control: Access control is the ability to check whether smart meters, gateways and local aggregators requesting
access to a resource have the necessary rights to do it.
• Privacy: Privacy of the users in Smart Grid is the ability to protect private information (i.e., identity, location, data
aggregation...etc) of smart meters, gateways, and local aggregators.
IV. COUNTERMEASURES, GAME THEORETIC AND FORMAL PROOF APPROACHES
In order to satisfy the security requirements for secure Smart Grid communications, namely, authentication, integrity, non-
repudiation, access control, and privacy, privacy-preserving schemes use the cryptography as a countermeasure. In this section,
we will discuss these cryptographic methods and we provide a description for game theoretic and formal proof approaches
used in privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grids.
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TABLE X
CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS USED IN PRIVACY-PRESERVING SCHEMES FOR SMART GRIDS
Xindicates that the scheme uses the cryptographic method.
Privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grids
Cryptographic methods
[26] [29] [5] [6] [9] [12] [15] [18] [17] [14] [8] [20] [11] [34] [31] [28] [33] [19] [25] [16] [13] [10] [22] [7] [30] [27] [24] [21]
Secure cryptographic hash
function [99]
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
PASSERINE public key
cryptosystem [100]
X
Dynamic accumulator
[101]
X
BBS+ signature
[102]
X
Role-centric attribute-based
access control [103]
X
Private Stream Aggregation
[104]
X X
Homomorphic encryption
[105]
X X X
Paillier encryption
[106]
X X X
Boneh-Goh-Nissim
cryptosystem [94]
X X
Public key encryption with
keyword search [107]
X
Hidden Vector Encryption
[108]
X
Batch verification algorithm
[109]
X
Identity-Committable Sig-
nature [110]
X
Partially blind signature
[111]
X
El-Gamal public key en-
cryption [112]
X
Schnorr signature scheme
[113]
X X X
Anonymous signature
scheme [114]
X
Id-based signature scheme
[115]
X X X
Off-line/online signature
[116]
X
Elliptic curve cryptography
[117]
X X
Identity-based
Encryption [118]
X
Pedersen commitment
[119]
X
TABLE XI
THE SCHEMES THAT USE HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION AND PAILLIER ENCRYPTION
Scheme Type Design goal
Li et al.
(2015) [6]
RLWE-based somewhat
homomorphic
encryption [105]
Proposing an optimized privacy-preserving
dual-functional aggregation scheme
Chen et al.
(2015) [9]
Homomorphic Paillier
cryptosystem [106]
Proposing a privacy-preserving data aggre-
gation scheme with fault tolerance
Li et al.
(2014)
[17]
Homomorphic Paillier
cryptosystem [106]
Proposing a multi-keyword range query
scheme
Dimitriou
et al.
(2016)
[10]
Homomorphic Paillier
cryptosystem [106]
Proposing two decentralized protocols to
securely aggregate the measurements of n
smart meters
Han et
al. (2016)
[30]
Partial homomorphic
encryption [120]
Proposing an integrated privacy-preserving
data management architecture
A. Countermeasures
In the literature, the cryptographic primitives are classified into three categories, namely, public-key primitives, symmetric-
key primitives, and Unkeyed primitives, as shown in Fig. 5 [126]. Note that we have not found any privacy-preserving scheme
for Smart Grid that use symmetric-key primitives. In addition, most of the privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grid use
secure cryptographic hash function [99].
The cryptographic methods used in privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grid are summarized in Tab. X. For ensuring
confidentiality, authenticity and non-repudiability of Smart Grid communications, the privacy preserving schemes use a public
key cryptography. The scheme in [21] uses PASSERINE public key cryptosystem [100], which is a lightweight public
key encryption mechanism. To encrypt a message m using PASSERINE, a user squares it modulo the public modulus n:
Z = m2 (mod n) . The scheme in [24] uses a Dynamic accumulator [101] which the accumulation function computes the
accumulation value of prime numbers and the witness-generation function computes the witness in order to uses them in the
IEEE 11
Fig. 5. Taxonomy of cryptographic primitives
TABLE XII
GAME THEORETIC AND FORMAL PROOF APPROACHES USED IN PRIVACY-PRESERVING SCHEMES FOR SMART GRIDS
Scheme Approach Main results
Saxena et
al. (2015)
[26]
BAN-Logic [121] Justification of security analysis
Jia et al.
(2014)
[23]
Game on leaking individual me-
ter’s measurements
Define the formal attack model and privacy
Fan et al.
(2014)
[20]
Sequences of games Proof of semantic security;
Proof of unforgeability;
Proof of batch verification security
Gong et
al. (2016)
[34]
Zero-Knowledge Proof [122] Ensures that adversaries cannot change the
pseudonym in the message
Rahman et
al. (2016)
[28]
Zero-Knowledge Proof [122] The winner can claim the incentive
Wan et
al. (2016)
[33]
Zero-Knowledge Proof [122] Ensures anonymous authentication and re-
warding;
Ensures unlinkable credentials and rewards
He et al.
(2016)
[16]
Game played between a prob-
abilistic polynomial time adver-
sary A and a challenger C
Provide the mutual authentication and is
semantically secure in the random oracle
model
Dimitriou
et al.
(2016)
[10]
Measurement indistinguishability
experiment
Proof the privacy of meter i’s measurements
He et al.
(2016)
[22]
Unforgeability, which the seman-
tic security is defined through
games played between a simula-
tor and an adversary
Define the security model
Tsai et al.
(2016) [7]
Security proofs used in ref. [123] Proof the security model of ID-based multi-
service provider authentication scheme
Liu et al.
(2016)
[27]
Zero-Knowledge Proof used in
ref. [124]
Proof the cryptographic building blocks
Saxena et
al. (2016)
[24]
Strand space model [125] Define the protocol as a sequence of events
for each role of the electric vehicle, local
aggregator, and certification/registration au-
thority
authentication function. The scheme [27] uses BBS+ signature [102] which is based on the short group signature. BBS+ uses
five algorithms, namely, GMSetup, APSetup, Join, GrantingAccess, and RevokingAccess. The scheme [30] uses role-centric
attribute-based access control [103] which the roles are assigned to users. The scheme [30] uses role-centric attribute-based
access control [103] on user attributes, object attributes, and permission filtering policy. Both schemes [29] and [5] use private
stream aggregation such as privacy-preserving aggregation of time-series data [104]. Therefore, homomorphic encryption [105]
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and paillier encryption [106] are used by five schemes in particular [6], [9], [10], [17], [30] as presented in Tab XI. The
homomorphic property under a message x is as follows, (x1) · ϕ (x2) = xe1xe2 mod m = (x1x2)emod m = ϕ(x1 · x2)
. In the Paillier encryption, the public key is the modulus m and the base g, the encryption of a message x is
ϕ (x) = gxrm mod m2, for some random r ∈ {0, · · · , m − 1}. The homomorphic property of Paillier encryption is as
follows: ϕ (x1) · ϕ (x2) = (gx1r1m) (gx2r2m) mod m2 = gx1+x2(r1r2)m mod m2 = ϕ(x1 + x2). Both schemes [12] and
[15] use Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem [94] that is a homomorphic public-key encryption scheme. The scheme [14] uses
public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) [107]. The PEKS is based on four algorithms: 1) Setup outputs public key
and secret key, 2) PEKS outputs a ciphertext C, 3) Trapdoor outputs the trapdoor information and 4) Test for checking the
ciphertext C. The scheme [8] uses hidden vector encryption (HVE) [108] which can be viewed as an extreme generalization
of anonymous identity-based encryption. The scheme [20] uses batch verification algorithm [109] that is based on a digital
signature scheme. The scheme [34] uses identity-committable signature [110] and partially blind signature [111] in order to
secure against adaptive attacks. The scheme [28] uses El-Gamal public key encryption [112] and Schnorr signature scheme
[113]. Note that both schemes [13], [16] use Schnorr signature scheme [113]. The scheme [33] uses anonymous signature
scheme [114] which allows a signer’s identity to be revealed if the signer signs the same message. The Id-based signature
scheme [115] is used by three schemes in particular [7], [22], [33]. Off-line/online signature [116] is used by the scheme [19].
Using the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields, both schemes [16], [25] uses elliptic curve cryptography [117].
Identity-based encryption [118], [127] is used by the scheme [7].
B. Game theoretic and formal proof approaches
In order to prove the effectiveness of their novel secure methods, researchers use game theoretic and formal proof approaches.
Tab. XII presents the game theoretic and formal proof approaches used in privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grids. In
particular, Gong et al. [34], Rahman et al. [28] and Wan et al. [33] use Zero-Knowledge Proof [122] as an approach to prove
the schemes that can ensure anonymous authentication. In order to define the formal attack model and privacy, Jia et al.
[23] use a game on leaking individual meter’s measurements. To prove the security model of ID-based multiservice provider
authentication scheme, Tsai et al. [7] uses security proofs of the work in [123]. In order to prove a privacy-preserving scheme
is secure in the random oracle model, He et al. in [16] use a game played between a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A
and a challenger C. Liu et al. [27] uses Zero-Knowledge Proof presented in the work [124] to prove the cryptographic building
blocks. Based on strand space model [125], Saxena et al. [24] defines the protocol as a sequence of events for each role of
the electric vehicle, local aggregator, and certification/registration authority. Therefore, the idea of sequences of games [128]
is used by the scheme [20] in order to prove the semantic security, unforgeability, and batch verification security.
Fig. 6. The realization processes of a privacy-preserving scheme for Smart Grids
IEEE 13
Fig. 7. Communication and system models used for Smart Grids
V. PRIVACY-PRESERVING SCHEMES FOR SMART GRIDS
In this section, we in-detail examine thirty privacy-preserving schemes developed for or applied in the context of Smart
Grids. As shown in Fig. 6, the realization processes of a privacy-preserving scheme for Smart Grids are based on seven
processes, namely, 1) definition of communication and system model (e.g., vehicle-to-grid architecture, smart grid marketing
architecture...etc), 2) definition of privacy model (e.g., location privacy, identity privacy,...etc), 3) definition of attacks model
(e.g., key-based attacks, data-based attacks...etc), 4) selection of countermeasures (e.g., cryptographic methods), 5) proposition of
main phases of the scheme (e.g., initial setup; registration process...etc), 6) security analyses using game theory approaches (e.g.,
Zero-Knowledge Proof), and 7) performance evaluation (e.g., in terms of storage cost and computation complexity). In addition,
as shown in Fig. 7, we classify these schemes in five categories based on the communication and system models, including, 1)
Smart grid with the advanced metering infrastructure, 2) Data aggregation communications, 3) Smart grid marketing architecture,
4) Smart community of home gateways, and 5) Vehicle-to-grid architecture. The surveyed papers as shown in Tab. XIII are
published between 2013 and 2016.
TABLE XIII. Summary of privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grids (Published between 2013 and 2016)
Scheme Communication
and system
model
Privacy model Goals Main phases Performances (+) and limi-
tations (-)
(1) Smart grid with the advanced metering infrastructure
Gong et
al. (2016)
[34]
Smart grid with
the advanced me-
tering infrastruc-
ture (AMI)
Customer privacy Guarantees
privacy, integrity,
and availability
Registration process;
Metering and querying
processes;
Settlement process;
Revocation process
+ Efficient in anonymity
- No threat model presented
- No comparison with other
schemes
- Needs study the communi-
cation and computation over-
heads
Saxena et
al. (2015)
[26]
Smart grid with
the advanced me-
tering infrastruc-
ture (AMI)
Privacy of users
(employees,
vendor engineers,
maintenance
personnel, and
security officer)
Providing both
authentication
and authorization
Initial setup;
Identity creation;
Accessing device;
Verification of the Iden-
tities
+ Efficient in terms of com-
munication and computation
overheads compared to [129],
[130]
+ Can be applied to different
user-roles
+ Prevent various insider and
outsider attacks
- Error-detection and fault tol-
erance are not considered
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Tan et al.
(2016)
[31]
Smart grid with
the advanced me-
tering infrastruc-
ture (AMI)
Privacy of users Guarantees
privacy, integrity,
and authenticity
Initialization;
Pseudo ID generation;
Message authentication
+ Degree of anonymity vs.
number of smart meters
+ Computation overhead vs.
number of smart meters
- No comparison with other
schemes
- Considers only the false data
attack
Rahman
et al.
(2016)
[28]
Three entities,
including, (a)
energy supplier
as registration
manager, (b)
automation
server as bidding
manager, and (c)
bidders
Customer privacy Providing
anonymity,
untraceability,
non-
linkability, no-
impersonation,
unforgeability,
non-repudiation,
verifiability, and
integrity
Pre-processing stage;
Bidder registration;
Bidding setup & key
generation;
Bid verification;
Winner announcement;
Incentive claim
+ Efficient in terms of com-
putation and communication
cost
- No comparison with other
schemes
(2) Data aggregation communications
Shi et al.
(2015)
[29]
Data aggregation
communications
from the
residential users
to the control
center in smart
grid with a key
management
center (KMC)
Privacy of users
(residential users)
Providing privacy
preservation,
error-detection,
and fault
tolerance
System initialization;
Data encryption and
reporting;
Aggregation with error
detection;
Dynamic Join and
Leave
+ Accuracy of aggregation
+ Efficient in communica-
tion and computation over-
heads compared to [5], [131]
- Many assumptions needed
to understand implementation
- Considers only the mali-
cious data mining attack
Deng
et al.
(2015)
[32]
Smart distribution
grid with a load-
serving entity and
multiple users
(e.g., smart build-
ing/community
or microgrid)
Privacy of users Solving the
demand response
problem in
a distributed
manner
Subgradient projection;
Distributed algorithm;
+ Comparison between dual
decomposition and fast ap-
proach
- No threat model presented
- Many assumptions needed
to understand implementation
Sun et al.
(2013)
[5]
Data aggregation
communications
from the
residential users
to the control
center in smart
grid with a key
management
center (KMC)
Privacy of users
(residential users)
Providing privacy
preservation,
error-detection,
and fault
tolerance
System initialization;
Data encryption and re-
porting;
Aggregation with error
detection
+ Efficient in computation
complexity and communica-
tion overhead
- No threat model presented
- No comparison with other
schemes
Jia et al.
(2014)
[23]
One aggregator
and users
(customers)
equipped with an
electricity smart
meter
Privacy of data
aggregation
Providing the
data aggregation
without leaking
individual meters
measurements
System initialization;
Meter’s reading report;
Privacy-preserving ag-
gregation
+ Efficient in term of compu-
tation cost of the aggregator
+ Consider the effect of the
human factor on the data ag-
gregate
- No comparison with other
schemes
Fan et al.
(2014)
[20]
Smart grid
with home area
network (HAN),
building area
network (BAN),
and industry area
network (IAN);
Three entities,
including, an
aggregator, users,
and an off-line
trusted third party
Privacy of data
aggregation
Avoiding the in-
ternal attacks
Initialization;
Registration;
Aggregation;
+ Efficient in terms of aggre-
gation and batch verification
+ Ensuring data integrity
compared to the schemes
[22], [132], [133]
- Energy cost is not consid-
ered
- Identity privacy and location
privacy are not considered
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Li et al.
(2015)
[6]
Three
communication
parties in smart
grid, namely,
data & control
center, residential
gateway, and a
large number of
residential users
Privacy of users;
Privacy of data
aggregation
Supporting dual-
functional (mean
and variance)
aggregation under
providing the data
aggregation
System initialization;
User report generation;
Privacy-preserving re-
port aggregation;
Secure report reading
+ Efficient in term of com-
putation cost and communica-
tion overhead
- No comparison with other
schemes
- Considers only chosen-
plaintext-attack
Chen et
al.
(2015)
[9]
Smart grid
communication
architecture,
including a
trusted authority,
a set of servers,
a control center,
a residential
gateway, and a
large number of
residential users
Privacy of users;
Privacy of servers
Privacy of data
aggregation
Providing the
data aggregation
with fault
tolerance
System initialization;
User report generation;
Privacy-preserving
report aggregation;
Secure report reading;
Fault tolerance
handling
+ Efficient in term of commu-
nication overhead
- Computation cost is not
studied
- Compared only with the
scheme [134]
Chen et
al.
(2015)
[12]
Smart grid
communication
architecture,
including a
trusted authority,
a set of servers,
a control center,
a residential
gateway, and a
large number of
residential users
Differential
privacy of users;
Privacy of data
aggregation
Achieving
privacy-
preserving
aggregation
of multiple
functions such
as average,
variance...etc
System initialization;
User report generation;
Privacy-preserving re-
port aggregation;
Secure report reading
+ Efficient in terms of com-
putation complexity and com-
munication overhead
- Compared only with the
scheme [104]
- Many assumptions needed
to understand implementation
Bao et al.
(2015)
[15]
Smart grid
communication
architecture,
including a
trusted authority,
a set of servers,
a control center,
a residential
gateway, and a
great number of
residential users
Differential
privacy of data
aggregation
Ensuring
differential
privacy of data
aggregation with
fault tolerance
System initialization;
Data aggregation re-
quest;
Data aggregation re-
quest relay;
User report generation;
Privacy-preserving re-
port aggregation;
Secure report reading
+ Efficient in terms of storage
cost and computation com-
plexity
+ Utility of differential pri-
vacy
+ Robustness of fault toler-
ance
- Communication overhead is
not studied
- Data integrity is not consid-
ered
Wang et
al. (2016)
[25]
Five different
entities,
including, users,
public cloud
server, smart
meters, utility
provider, and
trusted third
party
Identity privacy Balances the
anonymity and
traceability for
outsourcing
small-scale data
linear aggregation
Setup; Enc; TTP-Dec;
Re-key; LiAgg-ReEnc;
UPDec
+ Efficient in terms of Lin-
ear aggregation and confiden-
tiality compared to the RVK
scheme [135] and the LMO
scheme [136]
- Location privacy is not con-
sidered
He et al.
(2016)
[22]
Three
participants:
an offline third
trusted party, an
aggregator, and a
user
Privacy of users;
Privacy of data
aggregation
Achieving
authentication
and privacy-
preserving data
aggregationa-
gainst internal
attackers
Initialization;
Registration;
Aggregation;
+ Efficient in term of compu-
tational cost compared to the
scheme [20]
+ Internalattacks are not con-
sidered
- Insider attacks are not con-
sidered
- Energy cost and locationpri-
vacy are not considered
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(3) Smart grid marketing architecture
Jiang et
al. (2015)
[18]
SCADA in
smart grid with
three main
components,
namely, human–
machine
interface, master
terminal unit, and
remote terminal
unit
Availability under
privacy of users;
Forward secrecy;
Backward
secrecy;
Solving the
availability
problem in
resource-
constrained
SCADA system
System initialization;
Rekeying;
Self-healing
mechanism;
Adding new member
nodes;
Re-initialization
mechanism
+ Minimize the computation,
memory, communication,
and energy costs
+ Efficient compared to the
schemes [137], [138]
- Many assumptions about the
privacy needed to understand
implementation
Li et al.
(2014)
[17]
Smart grid
marketing
architecture
with main four
parts, including,
electricity
generators,
retailers, data
center, and
filtering center
Query privacy Providing secure
transactions
between sellers
and buyers;
Achieving
confidentiality
of keywords,
authentication,
data integrity and
query privacy
System initialization;
Auction message creat-
ing;
Trapdoor aggregating;
Filtering
+ Can achieving ranked
search and personalized
search simultaneously
compared to [14] and [8]
+ Efficient in terms
of computation and
communication overhead
- No threat model presented
- Energy costs is not
considered
Wen et al
. (2014)
[14]
Smart grid
marketing
architecture
with main three
parts, including,
energy sellers,
energy buyers,
and auction
managers (with
two servers:
a registration
server (RS) and
an auction server)
Privacy of the en-
ergy buyers
Achieving
privacy of the
energy buyers,
bid integrity,
and prefiltering
ability
Registration;
Bidding;
Pre-filtering;
Decision-of-winner
+ Efficient compared to the
scheme [139] in terms of the
computation and communica-
tion overhead in the one key-
word search process
- No threat model presented
- Ranked search and personal-
ized search are not considered
Wen et al
. (2013)
[8]
Residential
area composed
of a control
center, two
cloud servers,
a requester and
some residential
users
Query privacy Providing
the data
confidentiality
and privacy by
introducing an
HVE technique
Construction of the
range query predicate;
Encrypted data deposit;
Range query
+ Efficient compared to the
scheme [140] in terms of
communication overhead,
computation complexity and
response time
- No threat model presented
(4) Smart community of home gateways
Liang et
al. (2013)
[11]
Homogeneous
smart community
consisting of
home gateways
Identity privacy;
location privacy
Enables a resi-
dent to send a
service request to
nearby homes un-
der the identity
privacy and the
location privacy
Proximity score calcu-
lation;
Communication phase
of users;
Communication phase
of homes
+ Efficient in service rate and
obtained bandwidth
- No threat model presented
- No comparison with other
schemes
Bao et
al. (2016)
[19]
A trusted
authority, a
control center,
a residential
gateway, and a
great number of
residential users
U
Privacy of users Guarantees
privacy and
data integrity
simultaneously
System initialization;
Session key agreement;
Autonomous cluster
formation;
Off-line pre-
computation;
Online electricity usage
report;
Privacy-preserving
report collection;
Secure report reading;
+ Efficient in terms of com-
putation cost and communi-
cation overhead compared to
both the schemes [20], [141]
- Insider attacks are not con-
sidered
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He et al.
(2016)
[16]
A smart meter,
a server provider
and a trusted third
party
Customer privacy Providing the
smart meter
anonymity
and mutual
authentication
System setup phase;
Extraction phase;
Key distribution phase;
+ Efficient in terms of com-
putation cost and communi-
cation cost compared to the
scheme [7]
+ Resistance to impersonation
attack, replay attack, modifi-
cation attack, and man-in-the-
middle attack
- Many assumptions needed
to understand implementation
Ni et al.
(2016)
[13]
Three entities,
including, control
center,gateways,
and smart meters
Privacy of users Guarantees the
integrity of
consumption
reports
System setup;
User initialization;
Report generation;
Report aggregation;
Report reading;
+ Efficient in terms of
communication overhead
and computational overhead
compared to the schemes
[20], [142]–[144]
- Energy costs is not
considered
Dimitriou
et al.
(2016)
[10]
A collection of
smart meters
with the utility
provider/aggregator
Privacy of partic-
ipating meters
Providing secure
aggregate
collected
measurements
Initialization phase;
Non-interactive proof
of plaintext equality;
Encryption &
Decryption;
+ Efficient in terms of
communication overhead and
throughput
- No comparison with other
protocols
Tsai et
al. (2016)
[7]
A set of smart
meters and ser-
vice providers in
a smart grid
Anonymity of
smart meter
Achieving mutual
authentication
and smart meter
anonymity at the
same time
System setup;
Smart meter extraction;
Service provider extrac-
tion;
Mutual authentication;
+ Efficient in terms of compu-
tation costs compared to the
schemes [145]–[147]
-Data integrity and location
privacy are not considered
(5)Vehicle-to-grid architecture
Wan et
al. (2016)
[33]
Vehicle-to-grid
architecture
(consisting of
electric vehicles,
aggregators, and
a trusted third
party
Privacy of
electric vehicles
(EVs) owners
Providing the
anonymous
authentication
and rewarding,
unlinkable
credentials
and rewards,
fair exchange
for service
rewarding, non-
repudiation,
efficient system
maintenance
Initialization;
EV’s registration by the
trusted third party;
EV’s anonymous au-
thentication;
Local aggregators ser-
vice rewarding to EV;
Maintenance for EVs;
+ Efficient in processing time
and online processing time of
each phase
- No comparison with other
schemes
- Identity privacy and location
privacy are not considered
Han et
al. (2016)
[30]
Local aggregators
in vehicle-to-grid
network
Privacy of users Protect the
privacy of users
during the whole
data collection,
aggregation,
and publication
processes
Data aggregation
process;
Data publication
process;
Peer-level distributed
access control;
Separable key-chaining
management;
Hierarchical concealed
data aggregation;
+ Efficient in aggregation
throughput
+ Efficient against replay
attack, impersonation attack,
chosen ciphertext attack,
known plaintext attack,
physical attack, and inference
attack
- No comparison with other
schemes
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Liu et al.
(2016)
[27]
Three parties,
namely the user,
the reservation
service
provider, and the
charging station
Privacy for users;
Location privacy
Providing
the privacy-
preserving
reservation
system for
charging station
Setup phase;
User registration;
Reservation;
Charging;
+ Efficient in communication
overhead
- No comparison with other
schemes
- Storage cost not considered
- IP hijacking, distributed
denial-of-service attack and
man-in-the-middle attack are
not considered
Saxena et
al. (2016)
[24]
Three main
entities, namely,
the electric
vehicles, local
aggregator,
and certifica-
tion/registration
authority
Forward privacy;
Vehicle identity
anonymity;
Vehicle
untraceability
and information
privacy
Provides mutual
authentications
between the
electric vehicles
and the local
aggregator, and
between the
electric vehicle
and the certifica-
tion/registration
authority;
Preserves
privacy of the
electric vehicle’s
identity, location,
charge/discharge
selection,
expected time,
and battery status
Initial setup;
Electric vehicle
registration;
Home-
certification/registration
authority and Home-
local aggregator
communication;
Scheme execution;
+ Efficient in terms of com-
putation and communication
overhead compared to the
schemes [148], [149]
+ Vehicle identity anonymity
and location privacy are con-
sidered
- Energy cost is not consid-
ered
Abdallah
et al.
(2016)
[21]
Six main entities,
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Fig. 8. Advanced metering infrastructure
A. Smart grid with the advanced metering infrastructure
The advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) depends on sophisticated metering devices referred to as smart meters, as
discussed in the work of Karnouskos et al. in [150]. Fig. 8. shows an example of an AMI infrastructure which is based on
three parties, namely, a smart home, a communication device on utility pole and a utility office. Saxena et al. [26] proposes
a scheme in order to provide the privacy of users (employees, vendor engineers, maintenance personnel, and security officers)
in a Smart Grid with the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). Based on three phases, namely, 1) identity creation, 2)
accessing device, and 3) verification of the identities, the scheme that is proposed in [26] is not only efficient in terms of
communication and computation overhead, compared to the works in [129], [130], but also can be applied to different user-roles
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and can prevent various insider and outsider attacks. Error-detection and fault tolerance are not considered in the scheme [26]
compared to the scheme [29]. Deng et al. [32], proposes an idea to solve the demand response problem with both spatially-
and temporally-coupled constraints in the smart distribution grid with a load-serving entity and multiple users. In addition, a
recent work presented in [34], where Gong et al. proposes an idea in order to guarantee simultaneously privacy, integrity, and
availability in smart grid with the advanced metering infrastructure. Based on three main processes, including, 1) metering and
querying process; 2)settlement process; and 3) revocation process, the scheme can preserve the customer privacy by ensuring
the anonymity of fine-grained metering data. Similarly to the scheme in [34], Tan et al. in [31] proposes a pseudonym-based
privacy-preserving scheme which is capable of detecting false data injection attacks in a smart-grid system which is equipped
with advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). Besides, the scheme in [31] can reassure privacy, integrity, and authenticity.
Rahman et al. [28] proposes a scheme which considers three entities in a smart grid, including, (a) energy supplier as
registration manager, (b) automation server as bidding manager, and (c) bidders. Specifically, the proposed scheme focuses on
secure and private bidding for these three entities without relying on any trusted third party. Based on two main stages, namely,
1) winner announcement and 2) incentive claim, the scheme in [28] can provide anonymity, untraceability, non-linkability, no-
impersonation, unforgeability, non-repudiation, verifiability, and integrity. In addition, the scheme presented in [28] is efficient
in terms of computation and communication cost, but lacks comparison with other schemes.
TABLE XIV
SUMMARY OF THE BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRIVACY-PRESERVING SCHEMES OF DATA AGGREGATION FOR SMART GRIDS
Privacy-preserving schemes of data aggregation for Smart Grids
Char. [29] [5] [23] [20] [6] [9] [12] [15] [25] [22]
Aggregation
method
Private
stream
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gation
[104]
Private
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informa-
tion of
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struction
Summation
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reported
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tion
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aggregation
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High High Medium Medium High Medium High Medium Medium Medium
Scalability Medium Medium High Medium High High High Medium Medium Medium
Resilience in
case of node
mobility
Low Medium Medium Low Medium Low Low Medium Low Low
Timing strat-
egy
Periodic Periodic Periodic Regular
interval
Periodic Every 15
minutes
Every 15
minutes
Every 15
minutes
Periodic Periodic
Resilience to
link failures
Medium Low High High Medium Medium Medium High Medium High
Total com-
munication
in smart grid
O(N) O(N) N/A N/A n log q
l
(2n +
2) SN
(n +
1) LN
N/A N/A 1568 bits
B. Data aggregation communications
Data aggregation techniques in wireless sensor networks have been proposed in many works [151]. The basic idea of these
techniques is based on using an aggregator connected with users and a trusted authority as presented in Fig. 9. However, privacy
of data aggregation demonstrates many research challenges in privacy protection for smart grids, as discussed by Erkin et al.
in [43] and by Lu in [4]. Tab. XIV summarizes the basic characteristics of the privacy-preserving schemes of data aggregation
for Smart Grids.
In order to preserve the privacy of residential users using data aggregation from the residential users to the control center in
Smart Grid, Sun et al. [5] proposes a protocol called APED. In order to improve the APED protocol, Shi et al. [29] proposes a
protocol, called DG-APED. Specifically, DG-APED protocol uses three main phases, namely, 1) data encryption and reporting,
2) aggregation with error detection and 3) dynamic Join and leave. Using both data encryption and reporting phase, each
user perturbs his/her sensed data with generated noise. In addition, DG-APED is not only providing error-detection and fault
tolerance, but also is efficient in terms of communication and computation overhead compared to the schemes in [5], [131].
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Fig. 9. System model used in data aggregation communications
Similarly to the scheme in [5], Jia et al. [23] considered one aggregator and users (customers) equipped with an electricity
smart meter. Based on two phases, namely 1) meter’s reading report and 2) privacy-preserving aggregation, the scheme in [23]
can provide data aggregation without leaking individual meters measurements. Another interesting work for privacy of data
aggregation is presented in [6], where Li et al. proposes a scheme, called PDA. The PDA scheme is based on three phases,
namely, 1) user report generation, 2) privacy-preserving report aggregation, and 3) secure report reading. PDA is efficient in
terms of computation cost and communication overhead. In order to support both spatial and temporal aggregation of user
electricity usages, Chen et al. [9] proposes a scheme, called PDAFT, which is efficient in term of communication overhead
compared to the scheme in [134], but lacks a study of computation cost. In the same context of PDAFT, Bao et al. [15] proposes
a scheme called DPAFT, which is a new differentially private data aggregation scheme with fault tolerance in order to provide
fault tolerance for smart metering. Chen et al. in [12] proposes a scheme called MuDA, which is similarly to the PDAFT
scheme [9] and the DPAFT scheme [15]. The difference between PDAFT, DPAFT and MuDA is in cryptographic methods
used, i.e., PDAFT uses the Paillier encryption [106] and both DPAFT and MuDA use the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem
[94].
In order to avoid internal attacks against privacy of data aggregation, Fan et al. [20] proposes an idea based on aggregation
tree construction by running a breadth-first spanning tree algorithm. The scheme in [20] ensures not only data integrity
compared to the schemes [132], [133], but is also efficient in terms of aggregation and batch verification. Similarly to the
scheme in [20], He et al. in [22] proposes a scheme that can achieve authentication and privacy-preserving data aggregation
against internal attackers. Based on three main phases, namely, 1) initialization, 2) registration, and 3) aggregation, the scheme
in [22] is efficient in terms of computational cost compared to the scheme [20], but both energy cost and location privacy
aspects are not considered. Wang et al. in [25] proposes a protocol called BAT-LA in order to balance the anonymity and
traceability for outsourcing small-scale data linear aggregation. The BAT-LA protocol is efficient in terms of linear aggregation
and confidentiality compared to the RVK scheme [135] and the LMO scheme [136].
C. Smart grid marketing architecture
The integration of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems in Smart Grids allow the utility manager to
remotely monitor and control networks (e.g. HANs (Home Area Networks), the BANs (Building Area Networks), the IANs
(Industrial Area Networks), the NANs (Neighborhood Area Networks), the FANs (Field Area Networks), and the WANs (Wide
Area Networks) [1]. Malicious data in a SCADA system disrupt the management of these networks [152], [153]. For more
details about the threats, risks and mitigation strategies in the area of SCADA security, we refer the reader to the survey [154].
According to the conceptual model of National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), Fig. 10 shows an example
of a system model used in smart grid marketing architecture, which is based on four main components, namely, generation,
transmission, distribution, and customer, feature two-way power and information flows in Smart Grid.
Jiang et al. in [18] considered the availability under privacy of users in Smart Grid with three main components, namely,
human–machine interface, master terminal unit, and remote terminal unit. Based on the dual directional hash chains, Jiang et al.
proposes a scheme called LiSH+ to solving the availability problem in resource-constrained SCADA system. Specifically, LiSH+
uses four main phase, namely, 1) rekeying; 2) self-healing mechanism, 3) adding new member nodes, and 4) re-initialization
mechanism. In addition, LiSH+ can minimize the computation, memory, communication, and energy costs compared to the
schemes [137], [138], but many assumptions about the privacy are needed in order to understand implementation.
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Fig. 10. System model used in smart grid marketing architecture
Wen et al. [14] proposes a scheme called SESA which considers privacy of the energy buyers in Smart Grid marketing
architecture with main three parts, including, energy sellers, energy buyers, and auction managers (with two servers: a
registration server (RS) and an auction server). Based on three main phases, namely, bidding, pre-filtering, and decision-of-
winner, the SESA scheme is efficient compared to the scheme in [139] in terms of computation and communication overhead
in the one keyword search process. Ranked search and personalized search are not considered in the SESA scheme. As a
solution for query privacy, Wen et al.in [8] proposes a scheme called PaRQ for a typical residential area composed of a control
center, two cloud servers, a requester and some residential users. Based on three main phases, namely, construction of the range
query predicate, encrypted data deposit, range query, PaRQ can provide the data confidentiality and privacy by introducing
an HVE technique [108]. In addition, PaRQ is efficient compared to the scheme [140] in terms of communication overhead,
computation complexity and response time, but no threat model is presented. Similarly to PaRQ scheme in the context of query
privacy, Li et al. in [17] proposes a scheme called EMRQ in Smart Grid marketing architecture with main four parts, including,
electricity generators, retailers, data center, and filtering center. The EMRQ scheme can provide not only secure transactions
between sellers and buyers, but can also achieve confidentiality of keywords, authentication, data integrity and query privacy.
In addition, EMRQ can achieve ranked search and personalized search simultaneously compared to [14] and [8].
Fig. 11. System model used in smart community of home gateways
D. Smart community of home gateways
A smart community of home gateways is a virtual environment composed of networked smart homes located in a local
geographic region as discussed by Li et al. in [155]. Fig. 11 shows an example of a system model used in smart community
of home gateways which is based on three parties, namely, smart meters, local gateway, and control center.
As discussed in the recent survey of Fadel et al. in [156], the Smart Grid network can be divided into three segments,
including, Home Area Networks (HANs), Neighborhood Area Networks (NANs) and Wide Area Networks (WANs). Therefore,
the identity privacy and the location privacy are the most important models for privacy in ad hoc networks, as discussed in the
survey of Ferrag et al. in [126]. Besides, Liang et al. in [11] considered a homogeneous smart community consisting of home
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gateways, which can be considered as an ad hoc network. Specifically, Liang et al. in [11] proposes a scheme called EPS in
order to preserve both the identity privacy and the location privacy. Based on three main phases, namely, 1) proximity score
calculation, 2) communication phase of users, and 3) communication phase of homes, the EPS scheme enables a resident to
send a service request to nearby homes under the identity privacy and the location privacy. EPS is efficient in terms of service
rate and obtained bandwidth, but needs further study to determine its feasibility in terms of computation and communication
overhead. Bao et al. in [19] proposes a lightweight data report scheme. The scheme uses an online/off-line hash tree-based
mechanism and data integrity verification mechanism in order to protect user’s privacy and data integrity simultaneously. In
addition, the scheme in [19] is efficient in terms of computation cost and communication overhead compared to both the
schemes [20], [141].
He et al. in [16] proposes a scheme called AKD that can provide smart meter anonymity and mutual authentication. By
adopting Schnorr’s signature scheme [113], the AKD scheme is efficient in terms of computation cost and communication cost
compared to the scheme presented in [7]. The AKD scheme is resistant to impersonation attack, replay attack, modification
attack, and man-in-the-middle attack, but many assumptions are needed in order to understand the implementation. Ni et
al. [13] proposes a scheme called EDAT in order to guarantee the integrity of consumption reports. Based on three main
phases, namely, 1) report generation, 2) report aggregation, and 3) report reading, the EDAT scheme is efficient in terms of
communication overhead and computational overhead compared to the schemes [20], [142]–[144]. Dimitriou et al. [10] proposes
two similar protocols, namely, HC and BHC, for privacy of participating meters in order to provide secure aggregate collected
measurements. The HC protocol uses random numbers to secure the privacy of the measurements against Honest-but-Curious
(HC) behavior while the BHC protocol against Beyond Honest-but-Curious. Tsai et al. in [7] address the anonymity of smart
meter by proposing a scheme that achieves mutual authentication and smart meter anonymity at the same time. In addition,
the proposed scheme is efficient in terms of computation cost compared to the schemes [145]–[147].
Fig. 12. System model used in vehicle-to-grid architecture
E. Vehicle-to-grid architecture
The vehicle-to-grid (V2G) is a concept of the integration of the vehicles in Smart Grid as a distributed resource–load and
generation/storage device [157]. Fig. 12 shows an example of vehicle-to-grid architecture used in Smart Grid which is based
on five parties, namely, e-vehicles, hotspot service in smart charging station, NAN gateway, BAN gateway, and control center.
However, as discussed in the recent survey of Han et al. in [38], V2G network is one of the significant architectures of Smart
Grid where electric vehicles (EVs) communicate with service providers via aggregators or other networks. In this subsection,
we will review only the works published in 2016 that are not reviewed in the survey [38].
Wan et al. in [33] proposes a scheme called PRAC in order to preserve the privacy of electric vehicles owners. Based on four
main phases, namely, 1) EV’s registration by the trusted third party, 2) EV’s anonymous authentication, 3) local aggregators
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service rewarding to EV, and 4) maintenance for EVs, the PRAC scheme can provide anonymous authentication and rewarding,
unlinkable credentials and rewards, a fair exchange for service rewarding, non-repudiation, and efficient system maintenance.
Han et al. in [30] proposes a new architecture and practical data management system, called IP2DM, which is based on
local aggregators in V2G networks. Specifically, IP2DM can protect the privacy of users during data collection, aggregation,
and publication processes. Based on six main techniques involved in IP2DM architecture as onion-level encryption [158] and
Homomorphic encryption [105], the method is robust against many attacks, e.g., replay attack, impersonation attack, chosen
ciphertext attack, known plaintext attack, physical attack, and inference attack.
Liu et al. in [27] considers three parties, namely the user, the reservation service provider, and the charging station. Based
on reservation and charging processes, the scheme in [27] can provide the privacy-preserving reservation system for charging
station, but needs further analysis in order to test the resistance of the method against some attacks such as IP hijacking,
distributed denial-of-service attack, and man-in-the-middle attack. In order to resist against these attacks, Saxena et al. in [24]
considers three main entities, namely, the electric vehicles, local aggregator, and certification/registration authority. Hence,
some privacy models considered in [24] are not considered in the schemes [27], [30], [33] such as forward privacy, vehicle
identity anonymity, and vehicle untraceability. The scheme in [24] can provide not only mutual authentications between the
electric vehicles and the local aggregator, and between the electric vehicle and the certification/registration authority, but also
can preserve privacy of the electric vehicle’s identity, location, charge/discharge selection, expected time, and battery status.
In addition, the scheme presented in [24] is efficient in terms of computation and communication overhead compared to the
schemes in [148], [149]. In another recent work Abdallah et al. in [21] proposes a scheme in order to preserve the privacy of
electric vehicles. The scheme in [21] is efficient in terms of communication overhead and computation complexity compared
to the scheme [149].
TABLE XV
FUTURE CHALLENGES AND OPEN DIRECTIONS
Open directions
• New privacy-preserving schemes against Sybil attacks in Smart Grids
• New privacy-preserving schemes against Forgery attacks in Smart
Grids;
• Detecting and avoiding Wormhole attacks in Smart Grids;
• Novel Intrusion Detection mechanisms with low overhead for SCADA
systems in Smart Grids;
• New hybrid cyber range for testing security on ICS/SCADA systems
in Smart Grids;
• New privacy-preserving schemes for IoT-driven Smart Grid;
• New strategies for location privacy assurance in Smart Grids
• New privacy metrics;
• New access control systems for cloud computing services in Smart
Grids;
• New privacy-preserving schemes for Internet of Energy (IoE).
Future challenges
• Unsolved attacks of leaking privacy;
• Intrusion Detection mechanisms;
• Privacy-preserving schemes for IoT-driven Smart Grids;
• Interdependent privacy for Smart Grids;
• Access control system for cloud computing services in Smart Grids;
• Internet of Energy (IoE) and privacy-preserving technologies
• Ethics and Privacy
VI. OPEN QUESTIONS
As shown in Fig. 13a, 50% of the surveyed papers are published in 2016. The privacy-preserving schemes do not encounter
sufficiently key-based attacks and they focus on data-based attacks, as shown in Fig. 13b. The countermeasures used in these
schemes use both public-key primitives and symmetric-key primitives, and for game theoretic approaches, they use Zero-
Knowledge Proof [122] and other approaches such as strand space model [125], as shown in Fig. 13c. In addition, for the
security requirements in Smart Grid, these schemes focus on the privacy of users, privacy of electric vehicles, privacy of
data aggregation, integrity, and authentication, as shown in Fig. 13d. To complete our overview of privacy-preserving schemes
for Smart Grid communications, technical challenges and open directions for future research are described below and are
summarized in Tab. XV.
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Fig. 13. (a) Publication per year, (b) Number of papers vs. Attacks of leaking privacy, (c) Number of papers vs. Countermeasures and game theoretic
approaches, and (d) Number of papers vs. Security requirements
• Unsolved attacks and possible solutions: There are some attacks that are not dealt sufficiently in the surveyed privacy-
preserving schemes for Smart Grids such as Sybil attacks, Forgery attacks, and Wormhole attacks. These attacks can
pose a lot of privacy problems in wireless networks. As the Smart Grid is based on wireless communications to transmit
information, the future works addressing detecting and avoiding these attacks will have an important contribution for the
Smart Grid privacy. The idea of signalprints proposed by Liu et al. in [159] can detect Sybil attacks in delay-tolerant
networks without requiring trust, which can be applied for Smart Grids. Using the attribute-oriented authentication scheme
in Smart Grid, the forgery attacks can be detected and avoided, such as the work in [160]. The privacy-preserving scheme
in [161] can detect and avoid wormhole attacks on reactive routing for wireless communications, which can be applied
for Smart Grids.
• Intrusion Detection mechanisms for Smart Grids privacy: Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are not dealt in the
surveyed privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grids. Therefore, IDSs for SCADA system is an open issue that we are
working on [152], [162], [163]. Since the IDS systems can threaten users’ privacy [164], the future works addressing the
limitations from both domains will have an important contribution for the Smart Grid privacy. In addition, we believe
further research is needed to develop new open access big sets of data to be audited, which include a wide variety of
intrusions simulated in a Smart Grid environment.
• Privacy-preserving schemes for IoT-driven Smart Grids: The need for better privacy is an open issue for the IoT-
driven Smart Grids. A work recently published in 2016 by Wu et al. [165] address the mutual privacy and authentic
advertisements for the Internet of Things (IoT). Specifically, the private mutual authentication protocol of Wu et al. [165]
use cryptographic primitives such as Identity-based encryption [127] and prefix encryption. Therefore, how to extend
this private mutual authentication for the IoT-driven Smart Grids? Hence, privacy, discovery, and authentication for the
IoT-driven Smart Grids is one of the future works.
• Interdependent privacy for Smart Grids: Interdependent privacy for Smart Grids refers to actions of one smart meter
affect the privacy of other smart meters. Note that the Interdependent privacy has been defined as a recommendation
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for further research in our survey on privacy-preserving schemes for ad hoc social networks [126]. As discussed in the
survey on technical privacy metrics [166], there are two options for measuring interdependent privacy that can be used
by privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grids, i.e., measure or create new metrics. Hence, the future works addressing
the Interdependent privacy will have an important contribution to improving smart meters privacy in the Smart Grids.
• Access control system for cloud computing services in Smart Grids: There exist some contributions of cloud
technologies developed for Smart Grids, which is surveyed in [167]. The need for access control system is an open
issue for the cloud computing services in Smart Grids. A work recently published in 2016 by Liu et al. [168] address
the access control system for web-based cloud computing services depends on expressing the attribute predicate as a
monotone span program. Therefore, how to extend this system to the cloud computing services in Smart Grids? Hence,
privacy and access control for the cloud computing services in Smart Grids is one of the future works.
• Privacy-preserving schemes for Internet of Energy (IoE): Internet of Energy (IoE) is a new trend in the future of
energy where the Internet is interfacing with the power grid, such as the EU project named ARTEMIS-project in [169] that
brings together 38 partners from 10 European countries with the total budget Euro 45 million. A recent survey published
in 2016 [170] surveys the advances and state-of-the-art technologies of cyber-physical advances for IoE, none of them
carries study for the privacy-preserving in IoE. Proposing new privacy-preserving schemes for the IoE is one of the future
works.
• Ethics and Privacy: Users typically expect that the information collected for a specific role and context is treated according
to the ethical information norms of the respective communication context. Recently, Spiekermann [171] published a book
about ethical IT design where she discusses several aspects of ethics in IT. Based on the material presented in this book,
one major issue that arises is how to reassure that all the software running in a smart grid is ’ethical’.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we surveyed the state-of-the-art of privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grids, which are published between
2013 and 2016. We presented the survey articles published in the recent years that describe, namely, Smart Grid communications,
Smart Grid applications, Smart Grid security, and Smart Grid privacy. We also presented the major threats of leaking privacy
in Smart Grids, including, key-based attacks, data-based attacks, impersonation-based attacks, and physical-based attacks. We
reviewed the countermeasures, game theoretic, and formal proof models proposed for Smart Grids used by privacy preserving
schemes. We presented a side-by-side comparison in a tabular form for the current state-of-the-art of privacy-preserving
schemes (thirty) proposed for Smart Grids. As we have reviewed, privacy-preserving schemes for Smart Grids have advanced
significantly in recent years, especially because the need for better privacy for power industry has increased. There is still
various very fruitful and challenging research areas (e.g. detecting and avoiding new attacks, IDS architectures for Smart Grid
privacy, IoT-driven Smart Grids, new privacy metrics, Privacy for IoE) that need to be further developed in the future.
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